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Abstract—We consider two functions f1(r) and f2(r), for
r ∈ Rn and the problem of ‘Diffusing’ these functions together,
followed by the application of an encryption process we call
‘Stochastic Diffusion’ and then hiding the output of this process
in to one or other of the same functions. The coupling of these
two processes (i.e., data diffusion and stochastic diffusion) is
considered using a form of conditioning that generates a well-
posed and data consistent inverse solution for the purpose of
decrypting the output.
After presenting the basic encryption method and (encrypted)
information hiding model, coupled with a mathematical analysis
(within the context of ‘convolutional encoding’), we provide
a case study which is concerned with the implementation of
the approach for full-colour 24-bit digital images. The ideas
considered yields the foundations for a number of wide-ranging
applications that include covert signal and image information
interchange, data authentication, copyright protection and digital
rights management, for example.
Index Terms—Encryption, Steganography, Steganocryptogra-
phy, Information Hiding, Data Diffusion, Stochastic Diffusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of techniques for hiding information [1],
and, in particular, the field of Steganography, is important in
situations when encryption cannot assure data security due
to the encrypted information arousing suspicion or when the
transmission of encrypted information is incriminating (e.g.
in situations when the transmission of encrypted information
is banned, is illegal or subject to investigatory powers [2]).
Information hiding techniques generally embed plaintext data
into covertext data that one wishes to send secretly via
an innocuous ‘message’ based on the transmission of so-
called stegotext data, which should be in a form that restricts
detection or recovery of the hidden data. There are two
principal data hiding categories, namely, Watermarking and
Steganography, [3] and [4]. The work reported in this paper is
based on the latter case coupled with a further restriction on the
recovery of hidden data which is to first encrypt the data before
hiding it, an approach that we refer to as Steganocryptography
[5].
The information hiding method reported here considers a
convolutional encoding based approach which involves two
principal processes, namely, ‘Data Diffusion’ and ‘Stochastic
Diffusion’, the latter method having been researched and
implemented in a number of previous publications, e.g. [6],
[7], [8], and [9]. These processes are used to develop a
highly fragile and thereby tamper-proof method of hiding
encrypted data in a host data field. The method utilises the
properties and characteristics of the Fourier transformation
and the convolution and correlation integrals, and developed
for arbitrary dimensions so that applications of the method
can be used for encrypting and hiding information in digital
signals, digital images and for three-and four-dimensional (i.e.,
three-dimensions + time) signal processing applications. We
consider a case study that focuses on encrypted full-colour
image information hiding with applications that can include
image and e-document authentication, copyright protection
and covert encryption. To the best of the author’s knowledge,
the approach considered in this paper and the application
reported in the Case Study (Section V), is new and original,
specifically, the coupling of the data diffusion and stochastic
diffusion processes to produce an encryption scheme whose
inverse is ill-posed in absence of the covertext, much of the
paper being based on the material reported previously in [10].
II. CONVOLUTIONAL CODING REVISITED
Given a binary input stream f [n] = {0, 1}` consisting of a
‘block length’ of ` bits (0 or 1), for a binary Finite Impulse
Response function g[n] say, a convolutional encoder yields an





A convolutional encoder of this type describes a discrete
linear time-invariant system which is a fundamental model for978-1-5386-6046-/18/$31.00 © 2018 IEEE
processing digital signals in general, when f [n], g[n] and h[n]
may be integer or floating point arrays.
Convolutional codes are used extensively to achieve reliable
data transfer in numerous applications, such as digital video,
radio, mobile communications and satellite communications
[12]. These codes are often implemented in concatenation with
a hard-decision code, and, prior to turbo codes, such construc-
tions were the most efficient, coming closest to the Shannon
limit. One of the principal reason for using convolutional en-
coding is that maximum-likelihood decoding can be achieved
with reasonable complexity using time-invariant trellis based
decoders - the ‘Viterbi algorithm’ [13], for example, being
a common example of such an ‘error correction code’ [14].
In this context, we consider an approach that is based on
extending the convolutional encoding process to data fields
of arbitrary dimensions while considering a modification to
the process that yields a well-posed inverse solution to the
decoding (deconvolution) problem.
Consider a function f(r) for r ∈ Rn with n-dimensional
Fourier and inverse Fourier transforms
F (k) = Fn[f(r)] ≡
∞∫
−∞
f(r) exp(−ik · r)dnr and





F (k) exp(ik · r)dnk
respectively, k being the spatial frequency vector. If g(r) is
some stochastic function (a cipher) generated by a known
algorithm or some other source (a ‘code’ or natural noise,
for example), then convolutional encoding involves convolving
g(r) with f(r) to produce an output h(r) say, which we
can write as (⊗ denoting the nth order convolution integral
∀r ∈ Rn)




The transmission of such an output is taken to be corrupted
by additive transmission noise described by the function n(r),
say, which introduces errors into the recovery of f(r) from
h(r) and thus we arrive at an equation of the form
h(r) = g(r)⊗ f(r) + n(r) (1)
under the assumption that
‖n(r)‖ << ‖g(r)⊗ f(r)‖ ≤ ‖g(r)‖ × ‖f(r)‖
the ratio ‖g(r)⊗f(r)‖/‖n(r)‖ being known, in general, as the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio or SNR in the fields of signal processing
when r ∈ R1 and image processing when r ∈ R2.
This inverse (deconvolution) problem is as follows: Given
equation (1), and, with functions h(r) and g(r) known, obtain
a solution for f(r). In some cases, g(r) may not be known
and the problem becomes the so-called ‘blind deconvolution
problem’. In general, this problem is an ill-posed problem,
and consequently, has a range of solutions whose purpose is
usually to regularise the inverse solution in such a way that an
optimum estimate of f(r) can be obtained subject to certain
conditions. Most such solutions take the form fˆ(r) = q(r)⊗
h(r) where fˆ(r) is an estimate of f(r), q(r) is some filter
with Fourier transform Q(k) = Fn[q(r)].
The nature of equation (1) and the conventional (discrete)
convolutional encoding/decoding processes as discussed in this
section, is based on a model for an n-dimensional signal that
is ultimately related to the physical process that leads to the
generation and detection of a signal, [16], [17]. Equation (1)
is thus taken to be a fundamental model for the analysis and
processing of signals in general (albeit for the linear and time
or space invariant case) in a multitude of signal and image
processing applications, and, for this reason, solutions to the
deconvolution problem have been studied widely, e.g., [15]
and [17] and references therein. However, in regard to the
development of data encryption methods, we are at liberty
to ‘invent’ ideas that do not necessarily need to conform to
a systems model derived from and constrained by physical
principles (excluding the field of quantum cryptography). In
this context, the foundations for the approach considered in
this paper are compounded in the following section.
III. WELL-POSED DECONVOLUTION
The ill-posed nature of the deconvolution problem com-
pounded in equation (1) can lead to issues in the practical
use of convolutional encoding in terms of providing a unique
solution without the need to utilise error correction schemes
and/or regularisation techniques as briefly discussed in the
previous section. We now consider a fundamental theorem
associated with solving the deconvolution problem by ‘design-
ing’ a problem that is well-posed.
The ‘key’ to the original theme developed in this paper and
applications thereof is compounded in the following result:
For r ∈ Rn given the equation,
h(r)⊗ [g∗(r) g(r)] = f(r)⊗ g(r) (2)
where h(r) and g(r) are known (real or complex) functions
(⊗,  and ∗ denoting the nth-order convolution integral,
correlation integral and complex conjugate, respectively), the
exact solution for f(r) is given by
f(r) = g∗(r) h(r) (3)
This result is easily derived by using the convolution and
correlation theorems so that equation (2) can be written in
Fourier space as
H(k) | G(k) |2= F (k)G(k)
Multiplying both sides of this equation by G∗(k) we obtain
F (k) = G∗(k)H(k)
and using the correlation theorem, equation (3) is obtained.
Note that the solution for f(r) does not rely on the condition
| G(k) |2> 0 ∀k (as is the case with the generalised
deconvolution problem if regularisation is not imposed) and
is therefore a well-posed solution.
Equation (2) is consistent with an Infinite Impulse Response
(IIR) filter model (which is common in the presence of a
feedback topology) for a ‘perfect feedforward filter’. The
argument for this is as follows: For r ∈ Rn the output from a
IIR filter is given by
h(r) = g(r)⊗ f(r)− p(r)⊗ h(r)
where g(r) denotes the feedforward filter function and p(r)




| Q(k) |2 F (k), Q(k) = 1 + P (k)
so that upon rearrangement and inverse Fourier transformation
we obtain
h(r)⊗ [q∗(r) q(r)] = g(r)⊗ [q∗(r) f(r)]
Thus, in the case when the feedforward filter is a perfect filter,
i.e., when g(r) = δn(r), then
h(r)⊗ [q∗(r) q(r)] = q∗(r) f(r)
and it is clear that f(r) can be recovered from h(r) by
convolution with the feedback filter function.
IV. ENCRYPTED INFORMATION HIDING
Consider two functions f1(r) and f2(r) and the problem of
how to hide an encrypted form of the function f1(r) (using
convolutional encoding) by embedding it in the function f2(r)
(or vice versa as required). The problem falls into the field
Steganocryptography, cryptography being concerned with the
encryption of information and steganography being concerned
with the ‘art’ of hiding the content of one message in another.
Here, we are interested in hiding encrypted information (a
ciphertext in a covertext to produce an output known as a
stegotext).
A. Data Hiding and Recovery
Ignoring the encryption process (for the moment), consider
the case when
‖f1(r)‖∞ = 1 and ‖f2(r)‖∞ = 1
where
‖f(r)‖∞ ≡ sup{| f(r) |: r ∈ Rn}
and the additive ‘information embedding equation’
h(r) = cf1(r) + f2(r), c ∈ [0, 1]
where the constant c is the ‘Information Embedding Coef-
ficient’ (IEC). In this context, f2(r) is referred to as the
covertext, h(r) is referred to as the stegotext, f1(r) is referred
to as the plaintext, and, in order to hide the function f1(r) in
f2(r) effectively, we require that c‖f1(r)‖ << ‖f2(r)‖.
Clearly, given that ‖f1(r)‖∞ = 1 and ‖f2(r)‖∞ = 1, the
smaller the value of c, the smaller the perturbation of f1(r) to
f2(r) becomes, and, in practical applications of the approach
being considered here, necessitates optimization in such a way
that c is a minimum subject to the optimal reconstruction of





We can also apply an information hiding strategy based on
any exactly invertible transformation, e.g.,
h(r) = F−1n [cF1(k) + F2(k)]




F−1n [H(k)− F2(k)], H(k) = Fn[h(r)]
Also, note that since ‖f1(r)‖∞ = 1, renormalisation can be
applied in the computation of f1(r) thereby eliminating the





which avoids the need to know the precise value of c in the
recovery of the hidden data f1(r).
B. Data Diffusion
In order to recover the function f1(r) from h(r) it is clear
that f2(r) - the covertext - must be known. Because of this, we
consider the process of ‘diffusing’ the two function f1(r) and
f2(r) using convolutional encoding based on the properties of






under the condition that if the power spectrum | F2(k) |2= 0
for any value of k, then it is set to a value of 1 in order to
avoid any singularities that may occur in the computation of
the inverse filter F2(k)/ | F2(k) |2 given that in any and
all cases, when F2(k) = 0, we can apply the conditional
result: F2(k)/ | F2(k) |2= F2(k) = 0. Subject to this
‘renormalisation condition’, from Theorem 3.1, it is clear
that f1(r) can be recovered from g(r) by correlating g(r)
with f∗2 (r). If we then apply the Fourier-based hiding method
discussed in the previous section, then we can hide the function
g(r) in the covertext function f2 to construct the stegotext
function as follows:
h(r) = F−1n [cG(k) + F2(k)], G(k) = Fn[g(r)], c ∈ [0, 1]
C. Stochastic Diffusion
In addition to applying data diffusion, we can go further
and diffuse the function g(r) with a stochastic function
s(r), say, which in practice, is taken to be generated by
applying some key-dependent (cryptographically-strong) ran-
dom number generating algorithm (with a uniform statistical
distribution, a uniform power spectral density function, a
high Lyapunov exponent and high cycle length, for example).







subject to the same re-normalisation condition as discussed
Section III. We can then construct the following stegotext
function
h(r) = F−1n [cV (k) + F2(k)], V (k) = Fn[v(r)], c ∈ [0, 1]
in the knowledge that, via Theorem 3.1, f1(r) can be recovered
by correlating v(r) with s∗(r) to obtained g(r) and then
correlating g(r) with f∗2 (r) to recover the plaintext f1(r).
Note that this process can be repeated, i.e. v1(r) ≡ v(r) can
be diffused with another stochastic function s2(r) to produce
an output v2(r), the processing being repeated n times to
produce function vn(r) where each stochastic function sn(r) is
assumed to have been generated by the same (or different for a
multiple-algorithmic protocol) key-dependent pseudo-random
number generating algorithm subject to a different key.
D. Steganalysis
The method of encryption and information hiding consid-
ered is compounded in the following Fourier space-based
equation:




| F2(k) |2F1(k) (4)
where H(k) coupled with equation (4) are known publicly
(i.e., it is assumed that h(r) can be intercepted and that the
method of steganoencryption is known) and F2(k) is known
privately; in effect, F2(k) is a private key known only to the
sender and recipient of the function H(k) together with the
algorithm used for generating the key-dependent stochastic
field s(r).
From equation (4) it is clear that there is one known and
three unknown functions (ignoring the value of c) and the
problem of recovering F1(k) from H(k) is ill-posed given
that a well-posed problem has the following properties: (i) a
solution exists; (ii) the solution is unique; (iii) the behaviour of
the solution changes continuously with the initial conditions.
Consider the case where the covertext f2(r) and thus F2(k)
is known. In this case, we can solve equation (4) and obtain
a solution for f1(r) given by
f1(r) = s
∗(r) w(r) (5)
where w(r) = c−1F−1n [H(k)F ∗2 (k)− | F2(k) |2] and it is
clear that can the plaintext f1(r) can now only be recovered,
if and only if, the stochastic function s(r) can be constructed.
The problem is then reduced to the classic cryptanalysis
problem, namely, given that the key-dependent algorithm for
computing s(r) is known, find the associated key(s). In this
context, the application of a covertext function coupled with
data diffusion prior to convolution based encryption provides a
method for both hiding the cipher and enhancing the strength
of the cipher given that the solution to equation (4) for f1(r)
is ill-posed. Further, the diffusion of the function f1(r) with
f2(r) prior to encryption (of the diffused field) provides a way
of disguising any signature (statistical or otherwise) associated
with cipher used.
Suppose that the plaintext function f1(r) happened to be
known together with the covertext function f2(r) and the
transmitted data h(r); then from equation (5), it is clear
that (using the correlation theorem) s(r) can, in principle, be







, W (k) = Fn[w(r)]
But this result assumes that |W (k) |> 0∀k illustrating that the
de-correlation problem compounded in equation (5) is poten-
tially ill-condition and therefore requires the application of the
regularisation methods discussed in Section III, for example,
for which only a non-unique estimate to the stochastic function
s(r) can be found.
Assuming that the de-correlation problem posed by equation
(5) can be solved (in terms of generating a conditional esti-
mate), this result illustrates the importance of changing the key
and/or algorithm for computing s(r). For a single algorithm
protocol (in which the pseudo-random number generating
algorithm is used repeatedly - the more usual case) and a key
generating algorithm based on the covertext alone, the solution
for s(r) given above illustrates the importance of using a
different covertext function for each stegotext transmission in
order to minimise the potential for a successful attack. This
requires a database of covertext functions to be created and
shared prior to application of the method proposed. Such a
database would ideally be communicated using a one-time-
pad and a personalised encryption engine as discussed in [19],
[21], [22] and [23], for example.
V. CASE STUDY: ENCRYPTED IMAGE HIDING
Consider two digital images I1 and I2 of type real, each of
which are regular matrices of size N×M whose elements are
composed of floating point values between 0 and 1 inclusively
(typically obtained by conversion to normalised floating point
form from a k-bit image). Using the method discussed in Sec-
tion IV, we now consider algorithms for encrypting/decrypting,
hiding and recovering an image.
The plaintext image I1 is encrypted using both data and
stochastic diffusion and the output hidden in covertext image
I2 generating a stegotext image I3 from which a decrypt I4 is
then generated, all processes being applied separately to each
of the RGB components of colour input images. Clearly, the
differences between I2 and I3 should be a minimum as should
the difference between I1 and I4 which is examined later.
The method assumes the use of floating point arithmetic
throughout including writing the stegotext image to file. For
this reason, a Tagged Image File Format is considered in
which the floating point data is retained. This is a fundamental
requirement in order to recover the data prior to application
of the inverse processes required to output a decrypt which
is highly sensitive to (floating point) errors introduced into
the stegotext, thereby making the approach tamper-proof, i.e.,
floating point errors (subject to the floating point accuracy of
the computations) introduced into the stegotext image through
transmission noise or inspection by an attacker, including
quantisation of the image, for example, leads to a erroneous
decrypt.
Figure 1 shows an example of the application considered in
this case study. Two test RGB colour images (with 8 bits per
colour channel and of type .bmp) each of size 1024×768 are
used to illustrate the method for a value of c = 10−4 (the IEC).
For this case (i.e., image size and type), the value of the IEC
is optimal in terms of generating a stegotext with minimal
distortion subject to a decrypt with minimal error (both in
terms of the mean square error for each colour component),
the visual differences between I2 and I3 and between I1 and
I4 being insignificant. Diffusion of the images I1 and I2 is
undertaken using a Fast Fourier Transform, as is the inverse
process subject to the power spectrum being set to 1 if any
spectral components are zero.
Fig. 1. Example of the encrypted image hiding application: Plaintext .bmp
image (top-left) I1, Covertext .bmp image (top-right) I2, Stegotext .tiff image
(bottom-left) I3 and Decrypt .bmp image (bottom-right) I4. Each image is a
1024×768 RGB colour image with 8 bits per colour channel.
The stochastic function s(r) is computed using a con-
ventional pseudo-random number generator which returns a
uniformly distributed matrix of pseudo-random floating point
numbers of size N×M with floating point values between
0 and 1 inclusively. However, it is well known that such
conventional generators (i.e., linear congruential methods of
pseudo-random number generation and ‘Mersenne Twisters’,
for example) are cryptographically weak. Thus, in ‘field opera-
tions’ of the method discussed, the random number generating
functions should be based on generators that are known to be
cryptographically strong, and, ideally, personalised encryption
engines using new classes of chaos-based algorithms obtained
through the application of Evolutionary Computing and/or
Artificial Intelligence, for example, [18] and [20].
The pseudo-random number generating functions used for
stochastic diffusion (which implements the convolution encod-
ing process) and the associated inverse process (which recovers
the data) must or course use the same key which is set to the
‘state’ (the initial condition) of the random number generator.
While these keys can, of course, be generated independently
by the user, because the covertext image is critical to comput-
ing the decrypt, we consider using the covertext to generate
the keys directly (given that the covertext is, in effect, a key).
One way of doing this (and the way used in this Case Study) is
by applying the equations (for each RGB colour component)
kR = b‖aIR2 ‖2c, kG = b‖aIG2 ‖2c and kB = b‖aIB2 ‖2c
where a is any large number whose magnitude determines the







and bxc ≡ floor(x) denotes an output that is the largest integer
less than or equal to x.
It is envisaged that in the routine application of this algo-
rithm, and, given that the keys used for stochastic diffusion
are derived from the covertext, the sender and receiver of the
stegotext would agree a priori upon a database of covertext
images. Since the visual difference between the stegotext and
covertext is insignificant, a visual inspection of the database
using Thumbnails (i.e., reduced-size versions of the images
contained in a database which serves the same role for images
as a normal text index does for words as used by most modern
operating systems or desktop and mobile environments) would
be used to decrypt the encrypted image contained in the
stegotext by the user choosing the image in the database that
matches the received covertext. For large image databases,
visual search engines could be used to produce a ‘stegotext-
covertext match’.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The use of personalised cryptographic algorithms coupled
with the steganographic methods discussed in this paper and
compounded in the application of Theorem 3.1, increases the
threshold required for a successful attack to be launched in
order to recover the plaintext. The attacker is first required to
detect the existence of the encrypted information before an
attempt can be made to decrypt it, the use of steganographic
algorithms allowing for the existence of a ciphertext to be
unknown. To recover the information, the attacker needs to
first find a way of extracting the hidden encrypted information
from the covertext and then decrypting it using the appropriate
algorithm(s)/key(s). The exposure of the encryption key(s),
the encryption algorithm(s) and the embedding technique to
those other than the intended receiver is practically impossible
provided, given the design of the key generating algorithm
used in Section V, the covertext is not compromised, and
a different covertext is used for each transmission. In this
context, greater security would be provided if the key(s),
and, ideally the pseudo-random number generating algorithm
used for stochastic diffusion, were generated independently
from the covertext. This is of course at the cost of having to
implement a separate key/algorithm-exchange protocol, under
the fundamental cryptographic principle: Ein messgeist, ein
schlu¨ssel, eine chiffre - One message, one key, one cipher, a
principle that underpins the use of a One-Time Pad (OTP),
which yields ciphers that are unconditionally and compu-
tationally secure (i.e. secure given an upper bound on the
computational capabilities of an adversary even in the context
of a quantum computer given that an OTP is unconditionally
secure, e.g., [24], [25]). In regard to the work reported here,
this principle may be taken to be extended further to the
following Steganocryptographic law: One message, one key,
one cipher, one covertext.
The applications of the approach considered are numerous.
Coupled with appropriate key-exchange protocols to initiate
the use of cryptographically strong ciphers, the approach
provides a generic method of encrypting and hiding high
fidelity digital information, irrespective of the dimension of
the data. The encrypted data is highly sensitive to transmission
error and intolerant to distortion. The hidden data is therefore
very fragile and hence, relatively tamper-proof. This is due
primarily to the method of information hiding which relies on
floating point addition so that truncation of the stegotext due to
quantisation involving transformation from floating point to in-
teger form is not possible as is lossy compression, for example.
In regard to digital signal applications involving audio files, for
example, this is not an issue because audio files are composed
of streams of floating point data (ignoring application specific
data formatting and compression). However, digital images
commonly rely on ‘depth-quantisation’ so that they can be
displayed and retained as arrays composed of integers. This is
why Least Significant Bit methods are so popular in image-
based steganography, a method which has not been applied
in this case. Thus, a further investigation that would be of
value is to research different data embedding techniques, [26],
other than the floating point additive approach considered
here which necessitates the output image file having to be
written in floating point form. In this respect, MATLAB code
and a prototype Python script for investigating the algorithms
discussed in this paper, in particular, for the case study given
in Section V, are available in [10].
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